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Abstract 
By returning to the foundational principles of 
second-order cybernetics and resting on the central 
role of the observer, this essay explores how the 
distinction between data/information can be 
conceptualized. Using systems theory, we derive a 
series of systemic principles for the distinction 
between data/information and we illustrate them with 
a case study from Anti-Money Laundering.  
 
1. Introduction  
At the very heart of the field of Information 
Systems (IS) lies the concept of information. 
However, despite the critical importance of this 
concept along with the concept of the system, IS 
scholars have not really engaged with the combined 
theoretical challenge of exploring both. Approaching 
this topic systemically can allow us to delve deeper 
into the character of both data and information. We say 
both because systemically, as we shall see, it is not 
possible to ‘define’ one without referring to the other. 
This essay joins the call of several scholars that have 
stressed the need to investigate information further [8, 
21]. Boell for example [3:3] stresses the need to 
develop frameworks that can “help IS researchers, 
practitioners, and students when they seek general 
orientation into how information can be 
conceptualized”. Taking a step towards such a 
framework, we develop theoretical propositions from 
the body of systems theory, in the tradition of second-
order cybernetics [2, 9, 16]; our goal is to reflect on 
the distinction between data/information through 
systems theory, in the context of an observer-relative 
approach. The essay is structured as follows.  
The second section of this essay reviews in brief 
the main ‘camps’ of information. The third section 
delineates the key systems theoretical concepts and 
develops the relevant propositions. In the fourth 
section of the paper, the propositions are illustrated 
and applied through a sample case on anti-money 
laundering. The final section offers brief conclusions.  
 
2. Related work 
While there is no consensus or strict definition of 
information (or of an information system for that 
matter), we often tend to think of data as having some 
type of relation with the concept of information.  
     In tracing the different strands of information 
perspectives, Boell [3:10] provides a very useful 
classification and delineates four main stances on 
information at an ontological level: a) the physical 
stance where the existence of information can be 
conceived as independent of a human observer and is 
part of the physical world, b) the objective stance 
where information is observer-independent in the 
sense of true facts or physical inscriptions of 
knowledge, c) the subject-centred stance where 
information exists as cognitive process resulting from 
an observation, d) the sociocultural stance where 
information exists as shared sociocultural 
understanding of the importance of differences. 
Mingers and Standing [22:18] also identify the two 
main camps of information as objective (and 
independent of the receiver) and information as 
subjective (constructed by the receiver). While these 
categorizations are useful and we would like to 
position our essay in the subject-centered stance due 
to the primacy we shall place to the concept of the 
observer, we must stress that any categorization is in 
itself a product of observation that then abstracts the 
observer away [1]. In this regard, the concept of 
information is possibly one of the most challenging 
ones due to the level of abstraction that one has to 
attain for its description. For this reason, we develop 
the discussion starting from fundamental principles 
that relate to the function of an observer. We stress 
again that we’re not trying to define data or 
information uniquely. This means that, from within the 
context of our analysis, neither information nor data 
can be ‘defined’ as standalone entities. They need each 
other, a boundary between them, and an observer.  
    In order to facilitate the discussion that follows, we 
will be extracting a set of theoretical propositions 
(designated as P1, P2, P3, … Pn) through the application 
of systems concepts. Thus, the development of these 
principles has been weaved in together with the 
theoretical review. 
 
3. Information through theories of 
distinction 
Imagine a void (if that is physically possible) or more 
simply, a blank sheet of paper. Then draw a 
distinction. This could be a circle, or a mark like the 
one that Spencer-Brown [26] uses in his algebra:  
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Figure 1. The form of the distinction  
     What happens to that void or blank space once a 
distinction has been drawn? In basic terms, we can say 
that the space has been severed and two distinct spaces 
can be recognized: a marked space (e.g. within the 
circle) that represents the ‘inside’ and an unmarked 
space that represents the ‘outside’ (e.g. external to the 
circle). This is the starting place that we take, 
following George Spencer-Brown [26] who builds on 
the concept of distinction as the fundamental starting 
point of any act of observing. Luhmann also places a 
paramount significance onto the primacy of distinction 
in relation to observation. For this issue he remarks 
that “the world is observable because it is 
unobservable. Nothing can be observed (not even the 
‘nothing’) without drawing a distinction…”  [17:87]. 
     Everything else that follows in this essay, stems 
from this fundamental starting point through which all 
the rest unfold: we “take as given the idea of 
distinction and the idea of indication” [26:1]; we 
cannot make an indication without drawing a 
distinction. In other words, distinction is the starting 
point of all analysis, through which, “once a 
distinction is drawn, the space, states, or contents on 
each side of the boundary, being distinct, can be 
indicated” [26:1]. Put differently and as established by 
Spencer-Brown [26:ix], any indication implies duality 
in the sense that we cannot produce a thing without 
coproducing what it is not. In turn, this duality implies 
a “triplicity: what the thing is, what it isn’t and the 
boundary between them”. Or else, “you cannot 
indicate anything without defining two states, and you 
cannot define two states without creating three 
elements” (p.ix). The primacy of the distinction is 
fundamental, as is the role of the observer in defining 
a state. Following Spencer-Brown then, a number of 
questions are raised if we take the concept of 
‘information’: what is information? What isn’t 
information? What is the boundary between these two 
states? 
     The moment we draw a distinction, we indicate two 
distinct sides (a marked/observed side, and an 
unmarked/unobserved side). A convention in systems 
theory has become to call the space created inside the 
distinction the system and the side outside of it, the 
environment. Between the two, one can find the 
boundary. Then, the central paradigm under which we 
inform our systems theoretical analysis is neither the 
system, nor the environment, but the “relationship 
between system and environment” [16:176] (emphasis 
added). Thus, in our context, it is neither data, nor 
information, but the relationship between data and 
information. It is important to emphasize that “the 
concept of the environment in relation to that of the 
system, should not be misunderstood as a kind of 
residual category. Instead, relationship to the 
environment is constitutive in system formation…the 
point from which all further investigations in systems 
theory must begin is therefore not identity but 
difference…the system is neither ontologically nor 
analytically more important than the environment; 
both, are what they are only in reference to each other” 
[16:176–177]. Thus, we reach a first important 
principle that is general in systems theory: 
 
P1: We can only observe by drawing a distinction that 
indicates two sides (e.g. system/environment) and 
both are what they are only in reference to each other. 
 
So when we are considering the application of P1 to 
information and what information is not, we need to 
recognize that neither data nor information can ever 
be defined uniquely (this applies to all words as 
language itself is a self-referential structure where 
each word is ‘defined’ by others, ad infinitum as noted 
by Korzybski [15]). Furthermore, strict definitions of 
either data or information will fail as any effort to 
define them would equate to the creation of an 
“isolated ontology”; this is an impossibility based on 
P1. However, data and information can be approached 
relationally and considered as sides of a 
marked/unmarked space (e.g. system/environment). 
Thus, the task at hand is to place these two concepts 
(data and information) on the sides indicated by a 
primary distinction like system/environment.  
     So how should we start to explore the relationship 
between data and information? At this stage, two 
options present themselves if we were to start with 
data. The first option is to consider data as part of the 
system; the second option is to consider data as part of 
a system’s environment. However, in the context of 
taking an observer-sensitive approach, we posit that 
data can only be considered as part of the environment. 
This may be taken as an axiomatic position on our side 
but there is a logic behind this decision: once we 
consider the primary distinction to be that between 
system/environment and the elements that need to be 
placed on either side to be data and information, then 
we have the following combinatory possibilities.  
 
# System 
(marked space) 
Environment 
(unmarked space) 
Distinction 
1 Information Data information/data 
2 Data Information data/information 
3 Information Information information/ 
information 
4 Data Data data/data 
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Table 1: Elemental distinctions of data & information 
 
We shall illustrate our preference for option one by 
using reductio ad absurdum for the remaining options 
(a reminder here that this does not only mean that we 
eliminate absurd propositions but also those that are 
impractical or irrelevant in a specific context). Thus, 
the starting point of the application of reductio ad 
absurdum for us, is the context of an observer-relative 
analysis. We focus on the impracticality of the 
remaining options.  
     The fourth option (#4) whereby we have data both 
in the system and in the environment does not concern 
us as no observer is participating in the interactions 
between the system and its environment. If an observer 
internalized data then we would have information. But 
in option #4, we have both the marked and unmarked 
spaces containing identical elements (data/data); this 
essentially reflects a data processing system where 
there is no interference of a cognitive entity (i.e. a 
human being). As we will see in a moment, we 
consider that to be an essential part of using the 
concept of ‘information’ as part of any distinction.  
     The third option (#3) between 
information/information requires two distinct 
observers (one in the system and another one at the 
environment of that system). This would imply that the 
observer in the system receives the information that 
was communicated by the observer in the 
environment. Furthermore, this would demand perfect 
communication between these two cognitive 
observers. This is an impossibility. As Luhmann notes 
in a much discussed quotation: “humans cannot 
communicate; not even their brains can communicate; 
not even their conscious minds can communicate; only 
communication can communicate” [16:71]. Whatever 
is being communicated from one observer to another, 
it cannot be the information that exists in the cognitive 
state of an observer. Information in an observer’s 
cognitive state would need to be depicted in a 
notational schema (e.g. language, mathematics, etc) 
before being announced/uttered. The very act of 
depicting a cognitive state of an observer into a form 
that can be communicable, reduces its complexity [1]. 
In that sense, information is the observer-
relative/cognitive state that exists prior to 
communication. When an observer seeks to impart 
information then he/she needs to reduce its complexity 
so that it can become part of a semantic space and then 
a communications channel. This necessary 
complexity-reduction (of information that an observer 
wishes to communicate) is required so that 
information can be uttered; more critically, when this 
happens, information collapses into a state of being 
pre-observed (or waiting to be observed) and could 
thus be classified as data (instead of information). In 
this sense, we cannot have information without 
redundancy [14]. As Luhmann frames it: “Information 
is the surprise value of news, given a limited or 
unlimited number of other possibilities. Redundancy 
follows (in a circular fashion) from the fact that 
information is used when autopoietic systems operate. 
An operation reduces the selection potential from 
other contributions. A sentence, for instance, reduces 
the scope of contributions that fit into it” [19:33]. 
Thus, in the process of dismissing #3 for our primary 
distinction, we are led to pose a rather counterintuitive 
proposition, but one that is in line with the preceding 
discussion in an observer-relative context: 
 
P2: Information cannot be communicated (not 
without suffering a necessary reduction in its 
complexity); it is observer-sensitive.  
 
Of particular interest is our last remaining option (#2 
where we have data in the system, information in the 
environment). This distinction however is meaningful 
if and only if there is an observer in the environment. 
For such an observer, without any loss of generality, 
we could assert that they – from their own observing 
perspective – would consider information inside their 
own marked space (their system). In this regard, this 
reversal would end up in the same form with option 
#1. Thus, option #2 would coincide with option #1 in 
the context of an observer-relative system. All options 
considered, we are left with option #1 where we retain 
information inside the system and data in the 
environment of that (observing) system. In brief, 
whatever data is, it can be found in an unmarked and 
unobserved state where the observer does not observe.  
 
P3: Data is always in the environment of a system and 
part of an unobserved/unmarked space. It becomes 
information once the space on the ‘inside’ of the 
distinction between system/environment (i.e. the 
observing system) internalizes data.  
 
In this context and using Spencer-Brown’s notation, 
an information system could be represented in the 
following way (Figure 2) and defined as follows: An 
information system is a demarcated state, a space 
where an observer-relative transformation occurs and 
data crosses a systemic boundary to become 
information. This requires a cognitive observer. 
Alternatively, it would have required a mechanism 
capable of spontaneously creating distinctions through 
which this transformation can be realized (e.g. some 
future artificial intelligence).    
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Figure 2. An observer-relative information system 
 
There are two consequences to the above definition 
and the primary distinction between information/data. 
First, the centrality of the concept of the observer in 
indicating the two sides is fundamental; information is 
entangled with the observer. From this perspective, we 
cannot have information without observers, only data. 
Second, the indication created by the distinction 
between system/environment as information/data, 
highlights an important role for the boundary. The 
boundary is ontologically neither part of the system 
nor of the environment [18]. It is part of both. Through 
the boundary, the transmutation of data to information 
becomes possible. Through the boundary, the 
multiplicity of informational potentialities that exist in 
data is selectively internalized by the observer. We 
define the concept of information potentiality to be a 
characteristic of data prior to systemic (and thus 
observer-sensitive) internalization. Or else, if we 
consider the exact same data entity to be observed by 
different observers then each of these observers would 
generate different information; such variation in 
information will emerge from the interaction of the 
observer with the data. Thus, data entails a multiplicity 
of information potentials and these are selectively 
reduced by an observer that will allow for the 
emergence of information.  
 
P4: Data entails a multiplicity of information 
potentialities which are selectively reduced by an 
observer.  
 
In this context, the boundary between the system and 
the environment (ultimately in our context the 
boundary between information and data) plays an 
important role in shaping the mode with which data 
becomes internalized. Though it would take another 
paper altogether to explore in-depth the boundary 
conditions that shape the transmutation of data to 
information and vice-versa, it is important to 
emphasize that it is the (observing) system that 
‘controls’ the sensitivity of the boundary [16], thereby 
affecting the dynamics between itself as an 
information system VS its data environment. Let us 
explore these aspects (the centrality of the observer in 
information and the role of the boundary) a bit closer.    
    First, as we have already noted based on P1, the 
function of the observer is to create a distinction to 
begin with. Without the concept of the observer, the 
distinction would not have been possible. Thus, the 
form of the distinction is only in the eye of the 
observer. One example here comes from Heinz von 
Foerster who describes a piece of paper with 
letters/symbols on it. We can think of this as ‘data’; 
they are in a sense, some symbols in a piece of paper. 
Foerster then argues that only when you (i.e. the 
observer) look at the paper, you generate the 
information. As he put it: “information is generated in 
the one who looks at things” [11]. Of course, this 
condition presupposes a cognitive observer that can 
create a distinction through which the indication 
between information/data becomes possible. The 
crossing from the unmarked state to the marked state 
places the relationship between information/data 
within the remit of an observer. In addition, this affects 
how data can be defined relationally through both: a) 
the concept of the observer, and, b) the concept of 
information. These aspects lead us to establish the 
following:  
 
P5: Information presupposes the existence of an 
observing system (i.e. a system capable of creating 
distinctions spontaneously); data is what exists before 
observing.  
 
In other words, the observer plays the most pivotal role 
in a sequence of fundamental operations. These are 
interlinked with how any space becomes 
marked/unmarked and how the distinction between 
information/data can be conceptualized. For a first-
order observer that is engaged in the act of observing, 
we have the substitution of the subject/object 
paradigm to the triplicity mentioned before. Thus, we 
have an observing system, a boundary, and an 
environment. Applied to the distinction between 
information/data we have: an observing information 
system, a boundary (whereby feedback processes 
between information/data exchanges take place and 
the information system enables the transformation 
from data to information), and of course, an 
environment of data. 
 
Figure 3. Observer-guided information/data systemic 
differentiation 
 
A second-order observer, who can act as an ‘observer 
of observers’ may subsume the distinction above into 
his/her own marked space, but not without creating yet 
another unmarked space [19]. However, regardless of 
the level we’re looking at observation, for any given 
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observing system, the environment is always more 
complex but that does not mean that the environment 
has no structure [16]. Indeed, observers exist in the 
environment as well. In both cases, the form of the 
distinction (system/environment) remains the same as 
another observer in the environment would create 
another distinction that would have the same 
system/environment form. This has implications for 
information/data. As each of them creates unique 
system/environment (and thus information/data) 
differentiations, then 
 
P6: The observer-relative nature of distinction-
making implies relational conditions; coupled with 
the idea that the environment has structure, data can 
be data for one observing system (if it remains at its 
environment) and information for another observing 
system (if that system internalizes such information).  
 
Once again, from a different relational angle we come 
to the position that there is no information without an 
observer. Here, we must make a clarification. While 
an obvious observing system would be a human 
observer, an organization can also be considered to be 
an observing system since every organization observes 
itself and its environment and based on these 
observations, it reproduces itself [24]. Of course, the 
latter does not involve cognition. Also, we leave open 
the potential of a future artificial intelligence as 
another observing system capable of enabling the 
transformation illustrated in Figure 2.  
     Furthermore, the role of the boundary between any 
system and its environment is critical. While the 
separation between system/environment is a starting 
assumption in systems theory and a primary 
distinction, we’ve already mentioned how it demands 
a triplicity and a boundary between the two. Of course, 
“a system boundary never just is, ontologically, but is 
always coming into being as part and parcel of the 
system’s total ontogenesis, or as this will come to be 
called, autopoiesis.” [4:98]. As systemic ontogenesis 
(i.e. the act of a system coming into being) is observer-
dependent and observer-relative, the role of the 
boundary in the distinction between information/data 
is ‘controlled’ by the observer. The observing 
information system makes (poies) itself (autopoiesis), 
it identifies itself as an information system, by 
establishing a boundary between itself and its 
environment. It uses its environment (i.e. data) in order 
to maintain and organize itself (self-organization). By 
the concept of a self-organizing system we mean “a 
system that eats energy and order from its 
environment” so that it can increase its own internal 
order [9:8]. In that way, in the short term, the system 
can (attempt to) become negentropic. Negative 
entropy (negentropy) is perceived as contrary to 
entropy - the thermodynamic principle that systems 
run down to ultimate disorder or death. A good 
example to reflect on these conditions comes from 
evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr who describes that 
this is what every member of every species on the 
planet does, humans of course, included. As 
(biological) systems, we exploit the resources of our 
environment (natural resources) in order to avoid 
temporarily our natural tendency towards maximum 
entropy. For instance, if you stop eating and drinking, 
it won’t be very long before yourself (as a biological 
system) is driven to its maximum state of entropy (i.e. 
death). But even though that state of maximum 
entropy is unavoidable in the long-run, in the short-
term we are able to survive and flourish. We do that 
by consuming energy from our environment and so 
our system (the organism) becomes negentropic in the 
short-term by exploiting these resources from its 
environment [20]. It is through a similar mechanism 
that information systems develop an autopoietic 
character: they consume data from their systemic 
environment and through such consumption, they 
maintain themselves. Applied to an information 
system: 
 
P7: Information systems support themselves in the 
autopoietic sense by consuming data (equivalent to a 
source of energy) from their environment. They do so 
in order to become negentropic in the short run.   
 
While this negentropic pursuit remains a general goal 
orientation for any system that seeks to survive its 
(more complex and demanding) environment, it also 
raises further questions as to how this is achieved, 
pursued, or even structurally configured by the system. 
With the fear of stating the obvious, the richness of the 
IS literature in dissecting IS failures, illustrates that 
information systems can also be swayed towards a 
state of maximum entropy and an information ‘death’. 
This depends on how the (information) system enables 
the transformation of (part of) its data environment 
into a reduced, and thus, more manageable stream of 
information potentialities, before the users/observers 
internalize those as information. Building on the work 
of von Foerster [9] who addressed the connection 
between the system and the order it can consume from 
its environment, the following question can be raised: 
how much informational order can a system assimilate 
from its data environment, if any at all? While the 
quantitative rendition of this problem through the 
concept of entropy was introduced by Shannon to 
indicate the capacity of information transmission in a 
communication channel, it is important to remember 
here that Shannon’s constructs relate to 
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communication from an engineering perspective. 
Strictly speaking, these relate to ‘data’ and not 
‘information’; this is because meaning does not, and 
of course, cannot enter the equations. To add to the 
confusion, Shannon’s theory developed in the 
“Mathematical theory of communication” [25] is 
widely referred to as ‘information theory’. However, 
as documented by Heylighen & Joslyn, “while 
Shannon came to disavow the use of the term 
‘information’ to describe this measure, because it is 
purely syntactic and ignores the meaning of the signal, 
his theory came to be known as Information Theory 
nonetheless” [13:7].  
     In this regard, we must state clearly that the 
conceptual basis of the IS field, as it has evolved by 
recognizing an interaction between the technical and 
the social, and a role for human agency (however 
limited on occasion), cannot have a theory of signal 
transmissions as its foundational basis, one that is 
absent of ‘meaning’ and ‘observer’ considerations. 
Ultimately, the communication channel (a la 
Shannon) is a carrier for signals, data alone; such data 
enables a multiplicity of information-potentialities to 
be extracted by different observers. In other words, the 
observer internalizes and activates a particular 
selection of data that will cross over from the 
environment so that the emergence of information can 
surface. In this manner, we view the information-
potential that can be extracted from data, not as an 
objective property that characterizes data itself. It is 
dependent on different observers. Different observers 
will assimilate a different ‘order’. Also, strictly 
speaking, the information is not generated in the 
human observer from data alone (in a one-to-one 
correspondence relationship). Information emerges in 
the cognitive observer when the observer relates the 
transformation of data to information and connects the 
latter with already existing knowledge. 
 
4. An illustration of principles with 
Demetis’ case study on Bank X on 
Anti-Money Laundering  
In this section, we use a case study presented by 
Demetis [7] at Decision Support Systems about the 
role of technology in fighting money laundering in 
order to illustrate the principles presented in the 
previous section. While the analysis here does not 
substitute the in-depth case study, it gives us the 
opportunity to illustrate how the principles can be 
considered in an organizational context. Before doing 
so, we describe the institutional context in brief.  
    Banks (and several other reporting institutions like 
insurance companies, casinos, etc) are obliged to 
monitor transactions for potential money laundering 
(ML) behavior. When they think they’ve spotted 
suspicious behavior they have to file a Suspicious 
Activity Report (also known as a SAR) with the 
authorities who are tasked to investigate further and 
forward such cases for prosecution if there’s enough 
evidence. The banks use a variety of data for 
establishing suspicion but the starting point is always 
raw transaction data. These are filtered through 
transaction monitoring systems that apply a variety of 
algorithmic queries in order to flag suspects. Members 
of staff would then evaluate such technology-oriented 
flags manually and would escalate the issue internally 
to the Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO). 
In turn, the MLRO would submit these reports to a 
national authority, known as the Financial Intelligence 
Unit (FIU) that analyses all reports and may forward 
the cases further for prosecution. In the case-study 
itself, Demetis presents a series of internal, external 
and self-referential structural couplings in the context 
of AML and Bank X [7:101]. We will use those in the 
examples and analysis provided below.  
 
4.1. P1: Observing by drawing a 
distinction  
Based on this principle, an observing system draws a 
distinction that indicates two sides (e.g. 
system/environment) and both are what they are only 
in reference to each other. Each observing system 
draws its own distinctions. In the example case of 
AML, the primary distinction that is being used is 
between the bank as a system and its environment (the 
environment here includes law enforcement, other 
banks, the financial intelligence unit, prosecution 
authorities, media, etc) however a number of 
subsystems in the bank are also analyzed. Informed by 
the case study of the bank, we can distinguish three 
different forms of observing systems: i) the entire bank 
as an observing system (the whole of the system) that 
distinguishes itself from its environment, ii) a 
department within the bank like the AML department 
or the marketing department (i.e. an observing 
(sub)system within the system) that distinguishes itself 
from both its internal environment (i.e. the other 
subsystems) and its external environment, and 
ultimately, iii) human beings (e.g. a member of staff in 
the AML department) as the cognitive observing 
systems that can enable the transformation of data to 
information. Thus, we can distinguish three different 
observing systems from the AML case study that 
relate to the financial institution. 
      Two more general types of observing systems that 
can be distinguished from the case: i) an observing 
system that is set up to receive data from its 
environment and, ii) a cognitive observing system (i.e. 
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a human agent) that is capable of the actual 
transformation from data to information We use the 
accepted Unicode symbol [12] for the observer (o) to 
mean the following sentence: ‘from the perspective of 
the observing system of the…’. For example, the 
phrase “from the perspective of the observing system 
of the bank” can be written as “o bank”. We use this 
to indicate an observing system in general and the 
combination “o human” would represent a cognitive 
human observer.  
 
4.2. P2: Information cannot be 
communicated; not without suffering a 
complexity-reduction 
Unlike data, information is not a commodity which 
can be passed on from one observing system to another 
without any meaning modification, re-interpretation, 
or adjustment. No two observers can conceive of 
exactly the same thing as that would lead to a paradox 
of their identity. Furthermore, the “newness” [2] that 
any given information comes to bear on an observer is 
not an objective property of information. The 
emergence of information is itself contingent on the 
observing system wherein information emerges. In 
brief, if we take the observer into account then 
information cannot be communicated.  
     In the case study of the bank, Demetis [4:103] 
describes several mechanisms with which members of 
staff, ML analysts in particular, generate information 
about customer suspicious behavior by internalizing 
data. Based on P2, this information emerges within the 
observer and cannot be communicated as is. An 
illustrative scenario is when a ML employee 
internalizes data from flagged ‘suspect’ transactions 
by using the transaction monitoring system. The case 
study describes a series of factors like staff experience, 
training, perceptions about transacting & lifestyle 
behavior of suspect, and other behavioral 
characteristics that affect the communication of 
suspicion by the ML analyst. In this specific case, as 
the true positive rate of the software (the rate at which 
ML cases generated by the software were confirmed 
as true suspicions once members of staff scrutinized 
them) was very low at first (starting at ~1%), high 
levels of staff demotivation also became an important 
consideration, with staff becoming wary of 
scrutinizing transactions carefully. From the case, it 
becomes evident that a large number of characteristics 
affect how ML staff come to decide about whether a 
customer is suspect or not. These are not only their 
interpretations of customer behavior and transacting, 
but also personal, behavioral, psychological aspects of 
the staff themselves (their training, experiences, cases 
they’ve handled previously, etc). Ultimately, many 
different observer-relative elements converge into 
shaping the boundary between data and information. 
This deep nexus of observer-sensitive characteristics 
that have meaning for an observer and influence the 
process of information emergence, must face a 
necessary reduction in complexity if they are to be 
communicated. Without such a reduction, the observer 
would not have been able to depict what he/she 
perceives as information into a notational schema (in 
this case-example, ML staff submit an internal report 
to the MLRO, describing why a customer is suspected 
of money laundering). Of course, by default, the very 
use of a notational schema (like language), reduces the 
level and complexity of communication itself (a 
necessary prerequisite for its structuring). Ultimately, 
o human analyst, information is reduced to data that 
can be communicable, and o MLRO, such data is 
internalized as information based on another 
ecosystem of his/her own observer-sensitive 
characteristics and additional considerations. In the 
narrative of the case, Demetis describes an instance 
where o MLRO, all the ‘suspicious cases’ that were 
communicated by members of staff to the MLRO, 
were passed on to the Financial Intelligence Unit of 
the country, as the MLRO felt that there was no way 
of knowing whether in a national context the case 
could be suspicious (o MLRO, the data o human 
analysts were internalized as information by 
considering characteristics external to the system). In 
turn, o FIU who became inundated with SARs, this 
became data at the environment of their own system 
that would be internalized based on organizational and 
individual/analyst conditions, requirements, decision 
making processes, and so on. But at any given stage, 
what is actually communicated is not information, not 
in the way this was generated within a human 
observing system within the cognition of the observer; 
what is communicated is a collapsed and simplified 
form of the observer-sensitive information. This then 
becomes part of a communication channel, to be then 
perceived as data at the environment of another 
observer before being re-internalized as information. 
While we admit that P2 is counterintuitive, this is 
actually in agreement with Shannon’s work [25] 
whereby the social context, the human element, and 
indeed, the concept of the observer do not come into 
the picture (in fact, the word ‘observer’ is featured just 
twice in Shannon’s work to indicate an “auxiliary 
device” that “notes the errors in the recovered message 
and transmits data to the receiving point”); not a 
human agent as we would include that agent in IS 
research.  
 
4.3. P3: Data is always in the environment 
of a system 
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As we’ve noted in section 4.1., we have different 
levels of observing systems. However, regardless of 
what observing system perspective we may take, P3 
applies. We will look into this by following a 
sequence of how data becomes internalized from the 
system (the bank), the subsystem (the AML 
department), and the ML-analyst (the cognitive 
observing system), before being evaluated from the 
Money Laundering Reporting Officer (the MLRO) 
and sent to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) at 
national level. The sequence is: Bank à AML Dept., 
à ML-analyst à MLRO à FIU. So, o bank, data 
is at its external environment as raw transaction data. 
In turn, o AML department (as a subsystem), 
according to the case study of Bank X, a subset of 
raw transaction data commensurate with ML-
profiling practices would be the data at its 
environment. These enter first the boundary of the 
bank as raw transaction data and then are reduced in 
complexity by the transaction monitoring system of 
the bank. The output of the transaction monitoring 
system of the bank would in turn be internalized by 
money laundering analysts. As the cognitive 
observing systems, the ML-analysts have to decide 
whether a transaction is suspicious enough to be 
explored further, or not.  Thus, o human analyst, 
data at his/her environment includes the transactions 
that have been flagged by the software as potentially 
high-risk (as well as the raw transaction data that are 
at the environment of the bank as a system’s 
environment is also a subsystem’s environment). The 
human analyst would internalize such data and 
generate information that is observer-relative. In 
internalizing such data, the ML analyst connects it as 
an element to a nexus of other elements in his/her 
experience and previous knowledge. From this 
process, the human analyst generates information on 
whether the potential suspect for ML is truly suspect 
(again o human analyst) or not. However, once the 
human analyst generates this information, P2 applies 
(where information cannot be communicated without 
a necessary reduction in its complexity). Based on the 
case example, the assessment o human analyst will 
be depicted in an internal report (an internal 
Suspicious Activity Report), and this will become 
new data, at the environment of other observing 
systems. In this case, the observing system is the 
Money Laundering Reporting Officer who is at the 
board of directors and responsible for the bank’s 
compliance. In turn, o MLRO the data at the internal 
suspicious activity report need to be internalized by 
him/her so that another decision can be made. This 
re-activates the main distinction encapsulated within 
the internal activity report (between suspicious/non-
suspicious customer) and the MLRO may decide to 
reinforce one part to the distinction (e.g. suspicion) or 
dismiss it. In turn, when the MLRO submits a 
Suspicious Activity Report to the FIU that is an 
intelligence agency at a national level, o national 
authority, this is data again that has to be internalized 
and evaluated. Ultimately, as the primary distinction 
between any given system and its environment is 
relational and dependent on the observing perspective 
of a system, data is always at the environment of a 
system. How it becomes information is contingent on 
a series of interactions and boundary conditions and 
is down to individual cognitive observers and how 
they communicate. 
 
4.4. P4: Data entails a multiplicity of 
information potentialities 
As we’ve noted, the bank itself is set up in order to 
receive a specific kind of data from its environment; 
in this case study, o bank, this is financial 
transaction data from its customers (while there are 
other data in the environment of the bank like media 
and social networking services). In transacting with 
the bank, the customers essentially create the data 
that will cross the systemic boundary of the bank and 
find its way into the bank’s databases. This is where 
different information potentialities can be realized 
and redirected to different observing systems (before 
they are internalized as information by members of 
staff). From the case study of the bank that discusses 
how money laundering is profiled from different 
sources, we find examples of marketing and fraud 
related data that are used for money laundering 
profiling, while other data from the environment like 
enquiries from law enforcement agencies are also 
used. Here, the multiplicity of information 
potentialities that data holds is expressed in two ways 
in the bank. First, a more general observation is that 
the exact same data from the environment (i.e. raw 
transactions by customers) is used by different 
departments of the bank; in that way, transaction data 
are selectively reduced to different information 
potentialities. For example, the same (raw 
transaction) data can be used to: a) profile money 
laundering o AML subsystem, b) market new 
products or services like pre-paid cards, loans, etc,  
o marketing subsystem, c) find new sales 
opportunities o sales subsystem, d) monitor fraud 
related activity o anti-fraud subsystem, e) assess 
human resources required to handle new lines of 
business based on volumes of transacting and 
customer preferences o HR subsystem, and many 
more. Data itself holds a multiplicity of information 
potentialities depending on what observing system 
will attempt its internalization. However, it only 
Page 6307
 
 
 
9 
becomes information when a cognitive observer 
internalizes this data and generates the information 
that has meaning for that particular observer.  
     Quite often, as Demetis points out in the case 
study, the organizational structure and the hard 
divisions between departments will make it difficult 
for some observing subsystems within the bank to 
realize this multiplicity of information potentialities. 
We would argue that this is because they 
misconceive what they have as ‘information’ that has 
already been internalized for the purpose of the 
subsystem, instead of ‘data’ that holds a multiplicity 
of (external to the observing system) information-
potentialities. An example comes from the AML 
department that wanted to enable its members of staff 
to generate information (and thus, internalize it for 
their own purposes, meaning, and subsequent 
decision making) regarding suspicious behavior for 
ML from demographics data used in the marketing 
department. This data was originally only used for - 
strictly - marketing purposes by marketing staff. 
Initially, when AML staff approached marketing staff 
with the idea of using marketing data for money 
laundering investigations, this did not register at all 
with the latter as they could not see the potential at 
all. This was until AML staff asked marketing staff: 
“How would you market a product to a money 
launderer?” [7:100] This illustrates further that for 
any given human observing system within a 
subsystem (say members of staff within the AML 
department), data at its own environment entails 
further information potentialities even if it has been 
internalized by another observing subsystem. There is 
no limit to how this can be realized as the 
system/environment distinction is replicated 
internally within the system and can be realized as 
the distinction between information/data across 
different levels. One can draw parallels here with 
John Searle’s work with computation that must be 
observer-relative and that the one and the same 
process can be interpreted as different computations 
by different observers, a principle that he calls 
multiple realizability [23].  
 
4.5 & P5: Information presupposes the 
existence of an observing system; data 
is what exists before observing 
These two principles are complementary and express 
the primacy of the observer in relation to information. 
For data to exist, some observing system has created 
it. For instance, in our example, the ML-analyst 
creates an internal-SAR that is submitted to the 
MLRO. The ML-analyst uses data to generate 
information about the suspect and then communicates 
that as data in the form of the internal-SAR (that will 
in turn be internalized as information o MLRO). 
Thus, if we take the internal-SAR as the data being 
communicated o analyst to o MLRO, then data is a 
duality of both post-observed information (o ML-
analyst who created it) and pre-observed information 
(o future consumer of it that will internalize it in 
turn, in this case, the MLRO).  
4.6. P6: Data can be data for one 
observing system and information for 
another 
Either by choice, or because the data that an observer 
attempts to internalize is not relationally connected 
with and transformed into information by an 
observer, data may remain data for one observing 
system and information for another. An example 
from the AML case study comes from how staff 
demotivation affects SARs submissions. While the 
data from the transaction monitoring system ought to 
be internalized o ML-analyst so that an evaluation 
can take place about suspicious behavior, this does 
not always happen due to fatigue, demotivation, and 
a ‘pre-judgment’ that the customer would not be a 
suspect because the software has such a high false 
positive rate (originally > 99%). In this case, the 
distinction between information/data may collapse to 
a data/data distinction when o ML-analyst, data are 
not internalized, however o MLRO, this data is post-
observed information and will need to be internalized 
so that a final reporting decision can be made. Also, 
the exact same data may not be internalized by one 
observer but they could be internalized by another.  
4.7. P7: Information systems support 
themselves by consuming data from 
their environment  
Within the AML department, members of staff use a 
transaction monitoring system that flags and risk-
scores the suspects based on their transactions (this is 
built into the functionality of the software and adjusted 
by the bank). While it is beyond the scope of the 
present paper to explore how technology shapes the 
boundary between information/data, we can think of 
technology as a common background against which 
data/information distinctions are communicated and 
shaped. In this example, o AML department, 
information systems emerge by an observer within the 
marked space that includes: the AML organizational 
structure, the software applications used by the AML 
department for supporting its raison d’être and, of 
course, the human agents within the department (in 
this ML-analysts and the MLRO). This marked space 
that we denote as the information system of our 
example, is demarcated and distinguished from its data 
Page 6308
 
 
 
10 
environment (e.g. raw transaction data from customers 
and data that is filtered down for use from the AML 
department by the bank). However, without a data 
environment as a ‘source of energy’ to support its 
existence and its function of monitoring and reporting 
suspicious transactions (despite the many challenges 
in the effectiveness and AML compliance perceived as 
a cost-center within the bank), such an information 
system would not have been able to maintain itself. 
The information system is not only supporting itself by 
consuming data from its environment. It is structurally 
coupled with its environment; as we’ve noted, the 
environment is not a residual category but constitutive 
of the information system’s existence [16].  
 
5. Conclusion 
While the nature of data and information is 
challenging, we argue in this essay that the best way to 
reflect on them is by exploring them relationally and 
by including the central role of the observing systems 
in shaping the distinction between them. To the degree 
that IS upholds the relevance of human agency (even 
when that becomes restricted  and confined [6]), and 
to the degree that we’re talking about socio-technical 
systems, we believe that systems theory can yield 
considerable insights [5]. Within systems theory, 
second-order cybernetics that switches the emphasis 
from observed systems to observing systems [10] can 
provide a very rich theoretical platform upon which 
our field can rest for exploring its foundational 
concepts. 
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